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Abstract
Learning about the function and use of tools through observation requires the ability to exploit one’s own knowledge
derived from past experience. It also depends on the detection of low-level local cues that are rooted in the tool’s
perceptual properties. Best known as ‘affordances’, these cues generate biomechanical priors that constrain the number of
possible motor acts that are likely to be performed on tools. The contribution of these biomechanical priors to the learning
of tool-use behaviors is well supported. However, it is not yet clear if, and how, affordances interact with higher-order
expectations that are generated from past experience – i.e. probabilistic exposure – to enable observational learning of tool
use. To address this question we designed an action observation task in which participants were required to infer, under
various conditions of visual uncertainty, the intentions of a demonstrator performing tool-use behaviors. Both the
probability of observing the demonstrator achieving a particular tool function and the biomechanical optimality of the
observed movement were varied. We demonstrate that biomechanical priors modulate the extent to which participants’
predictions are influenced by probabilistically-induced prior expectations. Biomechanical and probabilistic priors have a
cumulative effect when they ‘converge’ (in the case of a probabilistic bias assigned to optimal behaviors), or a mutually
inhibitory effect when they actively ‘diverge’ (in the case of probabilistic bias assigned to suboptimal behaviors).
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Introduction
Tool-use refers to a type of behavior that consists in
manipulating ‘‘external objects with the goal of altering the
physical properties of another object, substance, surface, or
medium, via a mechanical interaction’’, or that consists in
‘‘mediating the flow of information between the tool user and
the environment’’ ([1] pp.1203). A growing amount of evidence
suggests that the acquisition of knowledge about object use and
function through observation is not the privilege of human subjects
[2]. Yet, the richness and complexity of our technology suggests
that we are particularly well adapted for such competence [3–6]. It
has been argued that this competence arises from a set of
interpretative and learning predispositions that allows human
observers to i) decode kinematic information into the causal
relationships between a behavioral sequence and its result [7], ii)
interpret biological movements performed by others as ‘rational’
(i.e. assuming that the most optimal actions means are adopted to
achieve a particular goal) [8], and iii) accumulate knowledge from
past observations about an agent’s intentions and behaviors, and
use this database in order to predict future events [9–13].
Together, these mechanisms would enable human observers to
derive knowledge about the possible uses and functions of a tool
from observing goal-directed, intentional movements performed
by an agent [14–16]. In this article we posit that these
sophisticated learning skills could also benefit from simpler
heuristics allocated to the detection of low-level, local sources of
information, such as the manipulative properties of objects [17].
These properties, called ‘affordances’, are not intrinsic to objects
but depend on their possible interactions with agents [18]. In its
extended form [19] an affordance defines a relational property
that emerges from matching the perceived physical features of an
object (e.g. size, shape, texture, density) and the agent’s
biomechanical architecture, her goals, plans, values, beliefs, and
past experiences. They are also described as dispositional states of
the agent’s nervous system [20]. Critically, affordances ‘suggest’
how one may interact with an object [21,22]. For example, the size
and shape of a softball mean that it fits into the human hand, and
its density and texture make it perfect for throwing. We posit that
object affordances contribute to delineating the number of
potential motor acts that can be performed on a given object.
They do this by generating effector-dependent, biomechanical
priors which are in line with the agent’s bodily architecture [17].
These priors then bias individuals to act on objects with the aim of
biomechanical optimization. In both human and non-human
primates, preferentially performed behaviors are generally those
that minimize the muscular and/or articulator costs, given the
object’s affordances and the desired outcome [23–26].
Crucially, this minimization of costs also transfers to tool use
learning. A prominent example is provided by our extensive
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complex physical attributes offer naı ¨ve users affordances that
enable the extraction of their functions at low cost [27–29].
Interestingly, the evolution of human technology might have
increased the utility of simple heuristics such as affordance
detection, in order to facilitate the highly demanding cognitive
problem of tool use learning [28,30–32]. In our technological
environments, the detection of affordances might thus play a
crucial role in the acquisition of tool use skills through individual
(i.e. trial-and-error learning) as well as social learning (i.e., learning
from observing another agent’s behaviors). Perceiving affordances
may thus facilitate the extraction of functional features associated
with an object manipulated by a third party [16]. For example,
based on the amplitude of the observed agent’s grip aperture and
the orientation of her wrist, as well as on the size and texture of the
object to be grasped, one may predict whether this object is meant
to be lifted, pushed, or merely transported [11]. As suggested
above, agents are expected to adopt tool-use behaviors that
minimize biomechanical costs. Therefore, learning of a tool
function through observation should be facilitated when a
demonstrator uses a tool in a way that fit the observer’s
biomechanical expectations (behaviors that minimize the muscular
and/or articulator costs), and should be jeopardized in the case
where these expectations are patently violated (behaviors that
increase the muscular and/or articulator costs).
Expert tool users, like tool learners, may also benefit from past
experience in their daily interactions with objects [33]. It has been
widely demonstrated that naı ¨ve human observers form knowledge
(e.g. about tools and their potential use) by taking advantage of
statistical regularities gathered from past observations [9–13]. The
more times an individual associates a certain observed goal (e.g.
the achieved tool function) with a certain observed action (e.g. the
way of achieving the tool function), the more likely she is to expect
that they will be seen together again [34]. These ‘probabilistic’
priors, acquired from past experiences, are crucial when the
biomechanical information conveyed by tool affordances is too
ambiguous or noisy to sufficiently constraint the range of
candidate functions. Conversely, reference to biomechanical priors
that are generated by tool affordances may be required when the
use of the current tool cannot be based on previous experiences.
Critically, both these classes of priors may be recruited when
sensory information conveyed by movement kinematics is too
incomplete to predict how an agent is most likely to behave. This
occurs when many competing intentions are equally congruent
with the not-yet completed behavior [11].
While the contribution of both these classes of priors to the
individual-learning of tools’ functions and use has long been
demonstrated, it is not yet clear whether, and how, they may both
combine to enable social learning of tool use (i.e., learning from
observing another agent’s behaviors). Here, we directly addressed
this question in a task that required participants to predict, under
various conditions of visual uncertainty, the intentions of a
demonstrator who was using a multi-purpose tool. Affordance-
related priors (termed ‘biomechanical’ priors) and priors acquired
from past observations (termed ‘probabilistic’ priors) were
manipulated by varying the biomechanical optimality of the tool
behaviors and the probability (low versus high) of observing optimal
versus suboptimal tool behavior.
We hypothesized that both biomechanical and probabilistic
priors would have an effect on prediction. First, participants
should be more accurate in predicting optimal than suboptimal
behaviors (biomechanical bias). Second, participants should be
more accurate in predicting behaviors that are most likely to occur
throughout a specific experimental session (probabilistic bias).
Third, we expected an interaction between these two classes of
priors, whereby participants would preferentially respond towards
the biased behaviors when the probabilistic bias is assigned to
optimal behaviors. Finally, we expected this effect to vary as a
function of the amount of visual uncertainty conveyed by the
action being performed. Thus, the propensity to respond towards
the biased behaviors should be strengthened as the amount of
visual information shown in the action videos decreases.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four healthy volunteers (mean age=26.5, SD=4.40)
took part in an action prediction task. All were right-handed, naı ¨ve
to the purpose of the experiment, and reported normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. The experimental protocol was
performed with approval of the University of Bologna –
Department of Psychology – ethical committee and in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki (2008) [35]. All participants gave
their verbal and informed consent to participate in the study.
Owing to the non-invasive, purely behavioral nature of our study
(without any emotional stimuli), the University of Bologna –
Department of Psychology – ethical committee considered verbal
consent was appropriate and approved this consent procedure.
Socio-demographic information (full name, age, sex, gender,
handedness, education) has been collected for each subject on a
separate sheet. The sheet contained an ‘‘Approve’’ box that was
checked by the experimenter after the subject gave their verbal
consent to participate.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted in movies featuring a demonstrator acting on a
two-purpose tool. The tool consisted of a movable handle screwed
onto the lid of a box. The handle offered two distinct affordances
enabling the demonstrator to grasp the object with a power or a
precision grip (see fig. 1). Using either grip, the demonstrator could
achieve two intentions: Opening the box by lifting the handle (intention
O); Switching on the light by rotating the handle (intention S) (see fig. 1).
Two movie formats were displayed, both having a total duration
of 2000 msec (see fig. 1): a complete format in which actions lasted
until the achievement of the underlying intention (the grasp and
the demonstrator’s final intention were apparent); an incomplete
format in which action course stopped 800 msec after movement
onset (only the grip was apparent but the demonstrator’s final
intention was not) while the last displayed frame was presented on
the screen for the remaining 1200 msec.
All movies were equalized for temporal homogeneity in such a
way that the duration of the sub-steps of each action involved the
same number of video frames (sub-step 1: static hand to physical
contact with the tool=1000 ms; sub-step 2: physical contact with
the tool to action end-state=1000 ms).
General Procedure
Participants sat in front of a monitor on which video clips that
showed a male demonstrator acting on a tool were displayed (see
fig. 1). The entire experiment was composed of three distinct
experimental sessions. In each session, participants had a different
probability of observing the demonstrator achieving his intentions
using an optimal (cost-free) or a suboptimal (high cost) behavioral
strategy [33].
For each of the three sessions, 4 blocks of 24 complete action
movies were interleaved with 4 blocks of 12 incomplete action
movies. Crucially, the probabilistic bias was exclusively assigned
during the complete action movie blocks, where participants could
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demonstrator’s intentions. In contrast, in the incomplete action
movies the amount of visual information was too low for the
observer to unambiguously infer the demonstrator’s intention.
Thus, blocks of complete action movies were used to generate
prior expectations in favour of either the optimal or the suboptimal
behavioral strategy. These expectations were induced through
biased probabilistic exposure. In contrast, blocks of incomplete
movies were used to test the effect of each type of bias
(probabilistic and biomechanical biases) on the participants’
decisions when confronted with visually uncertain action scenes
(see [11], for a similar procedure).
For each of the 144 action movies, participants were required to
predict the demonstrator’s intention by pressing, with their right
index and middle fingers, one of two adjacent computer keys
corresponding to the two possible intentions. The procedure used
was a self-paced procedure: participants were instructed to make
their response as soon as they thought they had enough visual
information to produce an accurate response. However, note that
both complete and incomplete movies ran until completion
independently of the subject’s response.
Typical trial
All trials started with a white fixation-cross that appeared for
1000 msec on a dark background. The fixation cross was
immediately followed by either a complete or an incomplete
action movie (see above for further details). After each decision,
response time was displayed on the screen for 500 msec. For those
trials in which participants did not respond, or responded too late,
‘NO RESPONSE’ was displayed on the screen. The next trial
started immediately after the 500 msec visual feedback period.
This feedback allowed us to avoid a ‘guessing bias’ that could
occur during the presentation of complete action sequences, and
that could hinder the integration of the probabilistic bias (see [11],
for a similar procedure). The presentation of stimuli and recording
of responses (correct/incorrect and response times) was synchro-
nized using E-prime2 software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc,
USA).
Biomechanical priors
The four possible action combinations (2 grips |2 intentions)
were divided into two types of behavioral category (optimal versus
suboptimal) on the basis of their low or high biomechanical cost.
This procedure allowed us to manipulate biomechanical priors
emerging from perceived affordances (see fig. 1):
i) Optimal behaviors. Using the power grip to achieve the
intention of opening the box by lifting the handle was cost-free, as
was using the precision grip to achieve the intention of switching
the lights on by turning the handle. These two combinations were
identified as optimal behaviors (low biomechanical cost).
ii) Suboptimal behaviors. The precision grip increased the
cost of achieving the intention of opening the box, whereas the
Figure 1. Examples of the four combinations ‘grip | intention’ that participants encountered during the experiment, and
that lead to ‘optimal’ or ‘suboptimal’ behaviors. All combinations began with the demonstrator’s static hand. The actor could then use
either a ‘power’ or a ‘precision’ grip to achieve either the intention of Opening the box (O) or Switching the lights on (S). The combination between the
kind of grip and the kind of final intention resulted in the complete action as being labeled biomechanically optimal (OPTIMAL) or suboptimal
(SUBOPTIMAL). Whereas the complete action movies lasted until the achievement of the underlying intention for a total duration of 2000 msec, the
incomplete action movies stopped 800 msec after the movement onset (when the demonstrator was about to grasp the tool) while the last
displayed frame remained on the screen for a duration of 1200 msec, so that observers had information about the grip but no information (on that
trial) about the demonstrator’s intention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039629.g001
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switching on the lights. These two combinations were identified as
suboptimal behaviors (high biomechanical cost).
The biomechanical cost of action movies were pre-tested on 10
naı ¨ve individuals. They were asked to estimate the muscular and/
or articulator cost of each perceived movement on a 5-point Likert
scale (ranging from 0= null cost to 5= very high cost). As
expected, optimal behaviors (precision grip/switching-on the lights
and power grip/opening the box, mean score =1.01) were
estimated as significantly less costly than suboptimal ones
(precision grip/opening the box and power grip/switch-
ingsssssssss-on the lights, mean score =3.13) (two-tailed t-test for
paired data: t=220.87, p,.0001). It is of note that the intentions
achieved with a precision grip were rated as less costly than those
achieved with a power grip for both optimal (precision grip/
switching-on the lights, mean score =0.55, versus power grip/
opening the box, mean score =1.47; two-tailed t-test for paired
data: t=254.83, p,.0001) and suboptimal behaviors (precision
grip/opening the box, mean score =2.90, versus power grip/
switching-on the lights, mean score =3.37; two-tailed t-test for
paired data: t=230.82, p,.0001).
Probabilistic priors
Unbeknownst to the participants, the probability of observing
the demonstrator using an optimal or a suboptimal behavioral
strategy was varied within the three distinct experimental sessions
(‘baseline’, ‘convergent bias’, ‘divergent bias’ – see below). Varying the
probability distributions of each possible strategy allowed us to
manipulate each participant’s probabilistic priors, that is, prior
expectations they could form about the behavioral strategy being
favored by the demonstrator to achieve the tool’s functions. After
each participant performed the task, we controlled for the extent
to which she/he was aware of the induced bias. As expected, none
of the subjects spontaneously reported that one type of action was
more likely observed than another.
i)Baseline session: no probabilistic bias. In the first
session, participants had an equal probability of observing the
demonstrator achieving his intention by performing an optimal or
a suboptimal behavior.
ii) ‘Convergent bias’ session: probabilistic bias towards
optimal behaviors. In this session participants were biased
towards ‘optimal’ behaviors to the detriment of ‘suboptimal’
behaviors. In 80% of the ‘box opening’ trials the demonstrator
opened the box using a power grip, and in 80% of the ‘light
switching’ trials he switched on the lights using a precision grip.
Here, behaviors that were preferentially used by the demonstrator
converged towards the participant’s biomechanical priors.
iii) ‘Divergent bias’ session: probabilistic bias towards
suboptimal behaviors. In this session participants were biased
towards ‘suboptimal’ behaviors to the detriment of ‘optimal’
behaviors. In 80% of the ‘box opening’ trials the demonstrator
opened the box using a precision grip, and in 80% of the ‘light
switching’ trials he switched on the lights using a power grip. Here,
the behaviors that were preferentially used by the demonstrator
diverged from the participant’s biomechanical priors.
All participants began the experiment with the baseline session.
The order of the two bias sessions (convergent and divergent) was
counterbalanced across participants.
Training phase
Prior to the experiment participants were familiarised with the
task. The training consisted of an unbiased complete action movie
block followed by an incomplete action movie block.
Data analysis
We analysed the percentage of correct responses (hits) and
response times (RTs) collected for both complete and incomplete
action movies. Responses for incomplete actions were encoded as
correct if the predicted intentions conformed to those that the
demonstrator actually achieved in their complete format. Partic-
ipants who responded too early on more than 10 percent of the
complete action movies were discarded from further analyses
(responses were considered as too early when they occurred
between 0 and 1000 msec after movie onset, making accurate
predictions impossible). Using this criterion, two subjects were
excluded.
All statistical analyses were performed separately for complete
and incomplete action movies. The magnitude of the probabilistic
bias and its interaction with biomechanical expectations was
investigated by comparing performance during the baseline session
with that during the two biased sessions. The hit rates and RTs
were then analysed using a 2| 2| 3 repeated-measures
ANOVAs. The first two-level factor was the ‘type of behavior’
(optimal versus suboptimal behaviors), the second two-level factor
was the ‘type of grip’ (power versus precision grip), and the third,
three-level factor was the ‘probabilistic bias’ (baseline versus
convergent bias versus divergent bias). Post-hoc Fisher tests were
used to compare performance between conditions.
We further investigated the learning dynamics internal to each
session by comparing data (hits and RTs) collected during the first
(time-step 1) and the second half (time-step 2) of each session.
Thus, for each session, the hits rates and RTs were analysed using
2| 2 | 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with ‘time-step’ (time-
step 1 versus time-step 2), ‘type of behavior’ (optimal versus
suboptimal behaviors), and ‘type of grip’ (power versus precision
grip) as two-level factors. Post-hoc Fisher tests were used to
compare performance between conditions.
For all analyses, p,.05 was taken as the criterion for
significance and eta squared ( ) was used as a measure of effect
size. Statistical analyses were performed using Statistica 9 (www.
statsoft.com).
Results
Overall performance
Complete action movies (Hits and RTs). The 2 (type of
behavior) |2 (type of grip) |3 (probabilistic bias) repeated-
measures ANOVAs revealed a main effect of the ‘type of behavior’
on both hits (F1,21=18.08, p,.001, =.46) and RTs
(F1.21=93.43, p,.0001, =.82). Participants were and faster at
predicting optimal than suboptimal behaviors (hits: 88% vs. 81%;
RTs: 1382 msec vs. 1444 msec). The main effect of the
‘probabilistic bias’ was also significant on both hits (F2,42=6.5,
p,.01, =.24) and RTs (F2.42=22.18, p,.0001, =.51). In the
divergent bias session, participants made more accurate predic-
tions compared to the baseline (hits: 88% vs. 84%, p,.05) and the
convergent bias sessions (hits: 88% vs. 82%, p,.001). However,
when compared to baseline, RTs were faster in both the
convergent (1368 msec vs. 1452 msec, p,.0001) and the divergent
bias sessions (1420 msec vs. 1452 msec, p,.05). It is of note that a
difference occurred also between the two bias sessions, with faster
RTs in the convergent bias session (1368 msec vs. 1420 msec,
p,.001). Finally, a main effect of the ‘type of grip’ was found on
hits only (F1,21=23.27, p,.0001, =.53), with participants being
overall more accurate at predicting behaviors that were performed
with a precision than a power grip (88% vs. 81%).
The two-way interaction ‘type of behavior’ | ‘probabilistic
bias’ was significant for both hits (F2.42=19.76, p,.0001, =.48)
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comparisons (LSD Fisher tests) indicated that during the baseline
session – where both types of behaviors were equally probable –
participants were more accurate (87.5% vs. 80%, p,.01) and
faster (1411 msec vs. 1492 msec, p,.0001) at predicting optimal
compared to suboptimal behaviors. A similar pattern was observed
in the convergent bias session. Participants were more accurate
(91% vs. 72%, p,.0001) and faster (1308 msec vs. 1427 msec,
p,.0001) at predicting the optimal behaviors when these
behaviors were more frequently shown than the suboptimal ones.
In the divergent bias session, no differences were found between
the optimal and suboptimal behaviors, despite the fact that the
latter were more frequently shown than the former (hits =85% vs.
90%, p..05; RTs =1427 msec vs. 1414 msec, p..05). Thus,
increasing the probability of observing suboptimal behaviors did
not significantly increase the number of correct responses for these
behaviors compared to the optimal ones.
Interestingly, the interaction effect between the optimality of the
behavior and the probabilistic bias was further modulated by the
type of grip used, as revealed by a significant three-way interaction
between all three factors for hits (F2.42=9.49, p,.001, =.31). In
the baseline session, the preference for optimal over suboptimal
behaviors was observed for power grip only (post hoc test
comparing optimal/power grip vs. suboptimal/power grip:
p,.0001; post-hoc test comparing optimal/precision vs. subopti-
mal/precision grip: p..05). In the convergent bias session,
participants were impaired at predicting suboptimal over optimal
behaviors irrespective of the type of grip used. In the divergent
session, no difference between optimal and suboptimal behaviors
was observed, irrespective of the type of grip used.
Incomplete action movies (Hits and RTs). The 2 (type of
behavior) |2 (type of grip) |3 (probabilistic bias) repeated-
measures ANOVAs revealed a main effect of the ‘type of behavior’
on both hits (F1.21=17.19, p,.001, =.45) and RTs (F1.21=6.97,
p=.01, =.25); participants were more accurate and faster at
predicting optimal than suboptimal behaviors (hits: 58% vs. 42%;
RTs: 1176 msec vs. 1215 msec). This preference for optimal
behaviors significantly differed from chance (t-test for single mean
compared to 50, t.4.40, p,.001).The main effect of the
‘probabilistic bias’ was significant only for RTs (F2,42=5.75,
p,.01, =.21). This indicated that, compared to the incomplete
movie blocks of the baseline session, participants make faster
Figure 2. Overall performances. a) and c) represent the mean percentages of correct responses collected during complete and incomplete action
movies for all three sessions. b) and d) represent the mean response times collected during complete and incomplete action movies for all three
sessions. The green columns refer to the mean percentages of correct predictions for observed ‘optimal’ behaviors (pooled across ‘power’ and
‘precision’ grip). The orange columns refer to the mean percentages of correct predictions for observed ‘suboptimal’ behaviors (pooled across ‘power’
and ‘precision’ grip). Error bars denote the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039629.g002
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(1156 msec vs. 1235 msec, p,.01). Note that they also tended to
make faster predictions in the incomplete movies of the divergent
bias session (1194 msec vs. 1235 msec, p=.08). The main effect of
‘type of grip’ was not significant (hits and RTs: all F..33, all
p..48).
The two-way interaction ‘type of behavior’ | ‘probabilistic
bias’ was significant for both hits (F2,42=9.84, p,.001, =.32)
and RTs (F2,42=3.34, p,.05, =.14) (see fig. 2c,d). As for the
complete movie blocks, post-hoc comparisons (LSD Fisher tests)
indicated that, in the baseline session, participants were more
accurate at predicting optimal than suboptimal behaviors (59% vs.
35%, p,.001). This preference for optimal behaviors significantly
differed from chance (t-test for single mean compared to 50,
t.3.32, p,.01).They were also more accurate (66% vs. 36%,
p,.0001) and faster (116 msec vs. 1197 msec, p,.001) at
predicting optimal than suboptimal behaviors in the incomplete
action movie blocks of the convergent bias session. Again, the
preference for optimal behaviors was significantly different from
chance level (t-test for single mean compared to 50, t.4.75,
p,.001). However, in the incomplete action movie blocks of the
divergent bias session, we did not find any differences between the
optimal and the suboptimal behaviors, although the latter were
most likely observed than the former in the complete movie blocks
that preceded (hits =49% vs. 55%, p..05; RTs =1187 msec vs.
1202 msec, p..05). Note that performances for both optimal (t-
test for single mean compared to 50, t,20.17, p..05) and
suboptimal behaviors (t-test for single mean compared to 50,
t.1.46, p=.15) did not significantly differ from chance.
Finally, the interaction effect between the ‘type of behavior’
performed (optimal vs. suboptimal) and the ‘probabilistic bias’
(baseline vs. convergent vs. divergent) was modulated by the type
of grip (power vs. precision) used by the demonstrator
(F2,42=3.37, p,.05, =.14). In the incomplete action movie
blocks of the baseline and convergent bias sessions, the difference
between optimal and suboptimal behaviors was observed inde-
pendently of the type of grip used. In the incomplete action movie
blocks of the divergent bias session, a difference between optimal
and suboptimal behaviors was observed only when both of them
were achieved by a precision grip (optimal/precision =47% vs.
suboptimal/precision =59%). Note that the proportion of correct
predictions for suboptimal behaviors achieved with a precision
grip differed from chance (t-test for single mean compared to 50,
t.2.38, p,.05).
Overall performance: preliminary discussion
(fig. 2). Results for the complete action movies demonstrate
that, compared to baseline, the probabilistic bias significantly
improved participants’ performance – as also indicated by faster
reaction times in the two bias sessions. Note that the rate of correct
responses was overall higher in the divergent session. This is easily
explained by the fact that, in the convergent session, the
probabilistic bias assigned to optimal behaviors concomitantly
increased the errors rate for unbiased (i.e., suboptimal) behaviors.
In contrast, the probabilistic bias assigned to suboptimal behaviors
did not alter the participants’ ability to accurately predict the
unbiased (i.e., optimal) behaviors. Thus, the higher the probability
that a behavior occured, the better and faster it was predicted,
irrespective of its type (optimal or suboptimal). These results
indicate that, as expected, participants were successful in
integrating the probability distributions of both convergent and
divergent bias sessions.
The second set of results shows that the biomechanical
constraints generated by the detection of tool affordances play a
major role in participants’ predictions: participants were more
accurate and faster at predicting behaviors that minimized
biomechanical costs, irrespective of probabilities. Thus, in both
the complete and incomplete action movies of the baseline session
(i.e. a session in which the demonstrator equally selected between
the two available behavioral strategies), participants preferentially
chose intentions achieved by optimal behaviors rather than
suboptimal behaviors (see fig. 2a,b,c,d). This result demonstrates
that when participants cannot rely on past observations (i.e., on
probability) to decide how an observed agent is most likely to
behave, they tend to rely on their biomechanical priors by default.
That is, they assume that the observed agent behaves ‘rationally’,
i.e., that he favors strategies which minimize biomechanical costs.
The third set of results concerns the interaction between the two
kinds of priors (biomechanical and probabilistic) (fig. 2a,b,c,d). We
found that both the magnitude and dynamics of the probabilistic
bias differed as a function of the type of behavior, with
participants’ biomechanical expectations overriding the effect of
the probabilistic bias. Thus, in the convergent bias session
(probabilistic bias assigned to optimal behaviors) performance
decreased for the suboptimal behaviors, and was facilitated for the
optimal behaviors, as expected. This pattern of performance –
observed in both the incomplete movie and complete movie blocks
– suggests that it is costly for participants to inhibit a response that
fits with their biomechanical expectations, even though a high
amount of visual information is available. However, in the
divergent bias session (probabilistic bias assigned to suboptimal
behaviors), no significant differences were found between the two
alternatives: participants did not preferentially choose the subop-
timal behavior over the optimal one, although the former was
more likely to be performed than the latter. This pattern suggests
that participants actively integrated both types of priors, by
combining their respective effects. Thus, when probabilistic and
biomechanical priors diverged, the overall effect tended to sum to
zero, resulting in performances that did not significantly differ
from chance for both optimal and suboptimal behaviors.
Finally, we found that the type of grip used by the demonstrator
had an effect on the participants’ predictions when i) the
probability of each competing intention was equal (baseline
session), and ii) when the intention that was eventually achieved
was fully visible (complete movies). This finding can be accounted
for by a facilitatory effect of the precision grip. Although suboptimal
behaviors that were achieved with a precision grip were estimated
as suboptimal, they were nevertheless estimated as less constrain-
ing than those performed with a power grip. Interestingly, this
facilitatory effect was easily overcome by the probabilistic bias,
since it disappeared in both the convergent and divergent bias
sessions. It is of note that this tendency to over-estimate the
optimality of precision grips may be due to the biomechanical
characteristics of the effector itself. Indeed, performing prehension
movements with either a power grip or a precision grip
differentially affects the synergies of arm segments. While the
achievement of a power grip exerts constraints on many degrees of
freedom of the arm (i.e. the wrist, elbow and shoulder) [36], the
precision grip offers more flexible solutions [37], independently of
the overall cost of the final action (e.g. opening the box with a
precision grip).
Learning dynamics
Complete action movies (Hits and RTs). i) Baseline session.
The 2|2|2 repeated-measures ANOVA performed on ‘time-
step’ (time-step 1 vs. time-step 2),‘type of behavior’ (optimal vs.
suboptimal) and ‘type of grip’ (power vs. precision grip) revealed a
main effect of the ‘type of behavior’ for both hits (F1,21=11.57,
p,.01, =.36) and RTs (F1,21=47.7, p,.0001, =.69), with
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and more accurately predicted (88% vs. 80%) than suboptimal
ones. A main effect of ‘type of grip’ was also found on hits only
(F1,21=9.48, p,.01, =.31), with behaviors achieved using a
precision grip being overall more accurately predicted than those
achieved using a power grip (87% vs. 80%). The two-way
interaction ‘time-step’ | ‘type of behavior’ was significant for hits
(F1,21=4.91; p,.05, =.19) (see fig. 3a). Post-hoc comparison
tests (LSD Fisher tests) showed that the difference between the
percentage of hits observed at time-step 1 for the optimal and the
suboptimal behaviors (90% vs. 78%; post-hoc test: p,.0001) was
no longer significant at time-step 2 (85% vs. 82%; post-hoc test:
p..05). Neither the main effect of ‘time-step’, nor the two-way
interaction ‘time-step’ | ‘type of grip’, nor the three-way
interaction was significant (hits and RTs: all F,2.93, all p..10).
ii) Convergent bias session. The same 2|2|2 repeated-measures
ANOVA performed on complete movie blocks of the convergent
bias session revealed main effects of ‘time-step’ (hits: F1,21=9.80;
p,.01, =.32; RTs: F1,21=6.87; p,.05, =.25) and ‘type of
behavior’ (hits: F1,21=34.09; p,.0001, =.62; RTs: F1,21=43.61;
p,.0001, =.67) on both hits and RTs. Participants were more
accurate but slower at predicting the demonstrator’s intention at
time-step 1 than at time-step 2 (hits =85% vs. 78%, p,.01); RTs
=1386 msec vs. 1337 msec, p,.05). Overall, they were more
accurate and faster at predicting likely optimal than unlikely
suboptimal behaviors (hits =91% vs. 73%, p,.0001;
RTs=1307 msec vs. 1416 msec, p,.0001). A main effect of the
‘type of grip’ was also shown on hits only (F1,21=17.26; p,.001,
=.45), revealing that participants more accurately predicted
behaviors performed with a precision than a power grip (87%vs.
77%, p,.001), independently of their optimality and of the time-
step. Furthermore, the two-way interaction ‘time-step’ | ‘type of
behavior’ was significant for hits (F1,21=9.07; p,.01, =.30) (see
fig. 3a). Post-hoc analyses (LSD Fisher tests) showed that
throughout the session, participants were overall more accurate
at predicting the optimal than the suboptimal behaviors, and that
this advantage for optimal behaviors increased over time (time-
step 1=91% vs. 79%, p,.001; time-step 2=91% vs. 66%,
p,.0001). The two-way interaction between ‘time-step’ | ‘type of
grip’ as well as the three-way interaction were not significant (hits
and RTs: all F,1.60, all p..22).
iii) Divergent bias session. The same 2|2|2 repeated-measures
ANOVA performed on complete movie blocks of the divergent
bias session showed a main effect of ‘time-step’ (F1,21=5.04.;
p,.05, =.19), with better performance at time-step 1 than at
time-step 2 (90% vs. 85%). A main effect of the ‘type of grip’ was
also found on hits (F1,21=6.99.; p,.05, =.25), with better
performance for behaviors performed with a precision than a
power grip (90% vs. 84%), irrespective of their optimality. The
interaction between the ‘time-step’ and ‘type of behavior’ factors
was significant for hits only (F1,21=6.85.; p,.05, =.25) (see
fig. 3a). In the first half of the session participants performed
equally well (post-hoc test: p..05) for the likely suboptimal (time-
step 1=89%) and the unlikely optimal behaviors (time-step
1=91%). In the second half, however, they were more accurate
at predicting the suboptimal behaviors (time-step 2=91% vs 79%;
p,.01). This was associated with decreased performance for the
unlikely optimal behaviors throughout the session (time-step
1=90% vs. time-step 2=79%). The main effect of ‘type of
behavior’, the ‘time-step’ | ‘type of grip’ interaction, and the
three-way interaction were not significant (hits and RTs: all
F,3.83, all p..06).
Incomplete action movies (Hits and RTs). i) Baseline
session. The 2|2|2 repeated-measures ANOVA performed on
‘time-step’ (time-step 1 vs. time-step 2),‘type of behavior’ (optimal
vs. suboptimal) and ‘type of grip’ (power vs. precision grip) showed
a main effect of the ‘type of behavior’ on hits only (F1,21=17.96,
p,.001, =.46). In the incomplete movie blocks of the baseline
session, participants were more accurate at predicting optimal
(59%) than suboptimal (35%) behaviors, independently of the
time-step. Neither the main effects of ‘time-step’ or ‘type of grip’,
nor the two-way interactions ‘time-step’ | ‘type of grip’ and
‘time-step’| ‘type of behavior’ (see fig. 3b), nor the three-way
interaction were significant (hits and RTs: all F,1.21, all p..28).
ii) Convergent bias session. The same 2|2|2 repeated-measures
ANOVA performed on incomplete movie blocks of the convergent
bias session revealed a main effect of ‘time-step’ on RTs only
(F1,21=9.53; p,.01, =.31). Overall, participants responded
slower at time-step 1 (1178 msec) than at time-step 2 (1141 msec).
A main effect of the ‘type of behavior’ was present for both RTs
(F1,21=14.11; p,.01, =.40) and hits (F1,21=21.17; p,.001,
=.50), with participants being more accurate (66% vs. 36%) and
faster (1116 msec vs. 1203 msec) at predicting optimal than
suboptimal behaviors. The main effect of the ‘type of grip’, the
‘time-step’ | ‘type of grip’ and ‘time-step’| ‘type of behavior’
interactions (see fig. 3b), and the three-way interaction were not
significant (hits and RTs: all F,3.77, all p..07).
iii) Divergent bias session. The same 2|2|2 repeated-measures
ANOVA performed on incomplete movie blocks of the divergent
bias session showed a significant interaction between the ‘time-
step’ and ‘type of behavior’ on hits only (F1,21=8.39; p,.01,
=.27) (see fig. 3b). Post-hoc tests (LSD Fisher tests) demonstrated
that in the first half of the incomplete movie blocks, rates of correct
predictions for the optimal and the suboptimal behaviors did not
differ (time-step 1=54% vs. 54%; p..05). However, a difference
occurred in the second half of the incomplete movie blocks, with
suboptimal behaviors being more accurately predicted than
optimal ones (time-step 2: optimal =44% vs. suboptimal
=57%; p,.001). Of note is the fact that this effect was due to
the rate of correct predictions for the optimal behaviors decreasing
over the session (time-step 1=54% vs. time-step 2=44%; p,.01).
However, neither the performance for suboptimal behaviors (t-test
for single mean compared to 50, t,1.47, p=.15) nor the
performance for optimal behaviors (t-test for single mean
compared to 50, t,21.32, p=.19) significantly differed from
chance level. No significant main effects were revealed (hits and
RTs: all F,1.87, all p..19). Neither the ‘time-step’ | ‘type of
grip’ interaction was significant (hits and RTs: all F,.74, all
p..40).
Learning dynamics: preliminary discussion (fig. 3). In
both the baseline and the convergent bias session, analyzing the
evolution of response patterns over time (from time-step 1 to time-
step 2) revealed an early preference for the optimal behaviors (see
fig. 3a,b). This preference was already present in the first half of
the baseline session and did not vary further with increasing
probabilities. Interestingly, this preference for behaviors that
minimized biomechanical costs seemed impervious to their
probabilistic likelihood sampled from past observations. This
suggests that biomechanical priors might short-circuit probabilistic
sampling, and might interfere with decisions based on the
extraction of statistical regularities.
In the divergent bias session (suboptimal bias), the evolution of
the response pattern from time-step 1 to time-step 2 suggests that
the absence of a difference between performance for optimal and
suboptimal behaviors – although the latter were more frequently
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for optimal behaviors (see fig. 3a,b). This preference progressively
decreased over time as the probability of observing suboptimal
behaviors concomitantly increased. However, overall, this increase
was not sufficient to compensate for the participants’ initial lack of
preference toward suboptimal behaviors.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the number of responses toward
optimal versus suboptimal behaviors was overall greater in the
incomplete, relative to the complete, action movies in both the
baseline and the convergent bias sessions. This difference may
account for the fact that the rate of hits for both the optimal and
suboptimal behaviors was very high in the complete movie blocks.
Therefore, the number of responses for optimal behaviors, and
hence the difference between the two types of behavior, could not
further increase due to a ‘ceiling’ effect. Alternatively, this
difference may be accounted for by the fact that, in conditions
of visual uncertainty, individuals tended to favor responses that
were consistent with their prior expectations. Interestingly, this
assumption is consistent with the finding that one’s priors (here, an
intrinsic preference for optimal behaviors) are primarily used to
complement sensory uncertainty in order to allow decisions, and
thus actions, to be made even in cases of noisy signals or sparse
data [11,16].
Figure 3. Learning dynamics. a) and b) represent the mean percentages of correct responses collected during complete and incomplete action
movies for all three sessions. The green columns refer to the mean percentages of correct predictions for ‘optimal’ behaviors (pooled across ‘power’
and ‘precision’ grip). The orange columns refer to the mean percentages of correct predictions for ‘suboptimal’ behaviors (pooled across ‘power’ and
‘precision’ grip). Error bars denote the standard error of mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039629.g003
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The aim of this study was to test how the biomechanical
expectations conveyed by tool affordances interact with prior
knowledge about tool function and use, and whether this
interaction influences predictions about a demonstrator’s inten-
tions when using tools. Here, we provide the first evidence that
low-level local cues such as object affordances influence the
learning and prediction of tool-use behaviors. We demonstrate
that biomechanical priors modulate the extent to which partici-
pants’ predictions are influenced by probabilistically-induced prior
expectations (see fig. 2). In particular, we found that when the
demonstrator’s behavior satisfied both the participants’ biome-
chanical and probabilistic priors, the learning cost decreased, as
participants efficiently combined both types of priors to make their
predictions. Conversely, when the demonstrator’s behavior
violated the biomechanical but not the probabilistic priors, the
learning cost increased, as participants had to deal with two
conflicting sources of prior information.
Specifically, the dynamics of the integration of these probabi-
listic expectations was strongly dependent on the biomechanical
optimality of the observed behaviors (see fig. 3). When the
probabilistic bias favored suboptimal behaviors, participants
needed a greater number of observations to neutralize a
preference for optimal behaviors, as well as to derive and use
probabilistic information to predict suboptimal behaviors. Fur-
thermore, performance during both the baseline and the
convergent bias sessions showed that participants exhibited an
initial preference for optimal behaviors that was sustained
throughout the session, and did not vary with changes in
probabilistic bias. Interestingly, this initial preference was even
stronger in the interrupted sequences, where subjects had little
information about the demonstrator’s intention. The strong
influence of biomechanical priors in these sequences suggests that
these priors might be primarily used in the case of noisy signals or
sparse data. As such, they may be specifically suited to reduce the
intrinsic uncertainty of goal-directed behaviors [16]. In sum,
biomechanical priors provided by the tool’s affordances acted as
an inductive bias [13], complementing the available perceptual
information when this information did not sufficiently constrain
the number of potential solutions (e.g. ‘opening a box’ versus
‘switching the lights on’).
Together, these findings complement recent results published by
Chambon and co-workers [11]. In their study, participants were
requested to infer the intentions of a demonstrator who performed
various actions on meaningless objects. The authors showed that
as the amount of visual information conveyed by movement
kinematics progressively decreased, participants responded more
frequently toward the intentions that had the highest probability of
occurring. Chambon et al.’s findings are consistent with a
Bayesian estimation scheme: the less information one has about
the action scene, the greater the weight of one’s priors in the
decision. Put another way: the higher the sensory uncertainty, the
more the probabilistic bias is used to ‘resolve’, or ‘complement’,
this sensory uncertainty. Our findings suggest that the effect of
priors gathered from probabilistic sampling of past observations
also depends on whether or not the visual information conveyed
by the movement’s kinematics meets the expectations that are
induced by an object’s affordances.
Even though visual information did not meet these expectations,
participants tended to assume the demonstrator to behave in an
optimal way. In other words, they expected the demonstrator to
act as a ‘rational’ agent – i.e., an agent who adopts the most
optimal (i.e., least costly) action means to achieve his goal given the
constraints of the current situation. This echoes recent evidence
showing that humans, even at a very early age, consider their
conspecifics to be rational agents [8,38,39]. Thus, children may
posit states of the world occasionally counterfactual to the
perceptual evidence (such as the presence of occluded physical
objects) but consistent with a rational interpretation of the
observed action [40,41]. Here, we show that, rather than being
restricted to external, environmental aspects of reality (e.g., a ball
jumps an obstacle to reach a new location versus a ball jumps to
reach a new location but there is no obstacle present), the
situational constraints through which the rational attributes of an
observed behavior are estimated, are extended to self-centred,
sensorimotor properties that observers share with the observed
agents.
This issue is currently debated in the literature. On one hand,
previous findings suggest that in early infancy such sensorimotor
cues do not play an essential, selective role in the rational
interpretation of observed actions. For example, Southgate and
colleagues[42] showed that 6- to 8- month-old infants attributed
rational properties to observed actions even when the movements
used to achieve them were biomechanically impossible. In their
study, rationality was defined as conditions in which the observed
goal-directed movements were adapted to external situational
constraints, independently of the biomechanical plausibility of
these movements. On the other hand, other evidence suggests that
a rational interpretation of goal-directed actions may be predicat-
ed upon sensorimotor information conveyed by movement
kinematics [43]. On a similar line, Southgate and co-workers
[44,45] recently showed that the motor system of 9- to 15-months
old infants was activated during the prediction of observed actions.
The authors proposed that the activation of the motor system,
instead of being driven by current visual information, was driven
by the infants’ expectations about the movements by which an
attributed goal would likely be achieved. Given these contradicting
data, one may speculate that the coupling of a rational
interpretation of goal-directed actions with the processing of
sensorimotor cues such as object affordances might be highly
dependent on motor expertise acquired from experience [46].
Furthermore, this coupling might mature later in development.
Our results suggest that the coupling of biomechanical with
probabilistic priors may be particularly strong in adult observers,
presumably equipped with a high degree of motor expertise.
Biomechanical and probabilistic priors may recruit two different
– and parallel – neural systems that occasionally combine to derive
information about tool use and function from observation.
However, the exact nature and function of these systems is still a
matter of conjecture. Effector-dependent, biomechanical priors
may exert their influence on action prediction by differently
weighting action alternatives within the motor repertoire of
posterior frontal cortices such that certain actions become favored
over others according to the biomechanical constraints of the
motor effectors. This process of weighting action alternatives could
be mediated by reciprocal inhibitory connections within the motor
cortices, either by suppressing or increasing the activity of current
competitors [47]. Occasionally, probabilistic priors may exert top-
down influences on the selection of action alternatives within
premotor cortices by using evidence gathered from past events to
re-assigning new weights to the set of possible actions. Interest-
ingly, these probabilistic priors may recruit more anterior frontal
regions, such as the dorsolateral [48] or the inferior parts [49] of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. As a result, one may speculate
that an abnormal connectivity between dorsolateral prefrontal and
premotor regions – resulting from an impaired biasing influence
from anterior to more posterior frontal cortices – would lead to
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jeopardize acquisition of motor expertise and the ability to infer
other people’s intentions from observation [52].
Conclusion
To our knowledge, the present study provides the first evidence
that object affordances play a major role in the learning and
prediction of observed tool-use behaviors. In particular, we show
that perceiving observed behaviors as rational depends on low-
level local cues from which their biomechanical costs are estimated
with regard to their final goals. We suggest that biomechanical
expectations elicited by affordances impede or bias the extraction
of probabilistic regularities from past events. When these statistical
regularities favor the observation of biomechanically suboptimal
behaviors, biomechanical expectations delay the acquisition of
probabilistic priors. Consequently, they also hinder the use of these
priors in solving the uncertainty that is associated with incomplete
visual signals.
Interestingly, one may extrapolate from our results that
increasing the number of observations for suboptimal behaviors
would further boost the weight devoted to probabilistic informa-
tion in the participants’ decisions. If this is the case what might this
boost reflect and how might the brain represent it? Further studies
should investigate how, and whether, the increasing weight of
probabilistic information is associated with an update of biome-
chanical priors. Such an update could occur through a mechanism
of visuomotor learning mediated by the plastic properties of the
motor system [53–55]. This would allow one to determine whether
the interaction between a ‘rational’ interpretation of actions and
the detection of affordances recruits a modular, domain-specific
process that would configure the experience of the external world
per se. Implications for the social learning of tool use could be
particularly important, as it would suggest that the larger the
magnitude of this interaction for learners, the less able they would
be to predict and learn from biomechanically suboptimal or
unexpected behaviors. More generally, we believe that this
cognitive selectivity for biomechanical optimality could contribute
to the convergence of individual behaviors towards homogeneous
patterns [17]. This could arise in the absence of high-level, faithful
social transmission mechanisms such as true imitation of observed
action goals and means [56–58]. Affordances could enhance the
efficiency of less precise, though less costly, forms of social learning
strategies in the acquisition of novel tool use, like emulation
learning [59] or stimulus enhancement [60].
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